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On its face, predicting the Biden administration’s international energy
policy would appear simple: look up the policy of the Obama administration.
Repeat. Done. There is, of course, more than a little truth to such an
understanding of the Biden administration. President Biden is himself an
alumnus of the Obama administration with significant input on the foreign
policy and energy policy decisions from the Obama administration. Many of
the people who will be tasked with implementing the Biden administration’s
international energy policy will themselves also be alumni and alumnae of the
Obama administration. Surely, then there will be more than a little overlap
between where the Obama administration left off and the Biden administration
will begin.
But one should tread cautiously in assuming that a Biden administration
will simply pick up where the Obama administration left off. There are three
important factors to consider. The first is the simple passage of time. The
passage of time is a particularly dramatic factor for international energy policy
due to the climate change clock. Current estimates suggest that climate
tipping points will be reached by 2030.1 These estimates may well be overly
optimistic. Four years of relative domestic and international inaction therefore
leaves the Biden administration with a qualitatively different starting position
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than a Clinton administration would have encountered. As such, the Biden
administration cannot simply use the Obama playbook. The runway to
doomsday has now been shortened by approximately one-third.
The second factor is economic. The COVID-19 pandemic has left the
world in a state of severe economic distress. It has killed more than 2.3 million
people worldwide.2 It has shut down countries and continents. In the process,
it has severely tested existing supply lines and thrown global markets into
chaos. One might thus analogize that the world finds itself closer to 2008
economically than 2016. The important caveat being that massive
government resources—in the trillions of dollars—have already been
marshaled to hold at bay the worst consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.3
These resources, therefore, look to be potentially unavailable to combat
climate change.
The third factor is personal. President Biden by all accounts is far more
of a moderate on global energy policy than many Obama administration
alumni and possibly President Obama himself. President Biden is in many
ways an institutionalist and traditionalist—dare one say a “small-c
conservative.” He would thus be less inclined towards radical and fast change
than the prior administration would have been.
Where does that leave the Biden administration? As this Essay will
explore, it requires the Biden administration to respond to a worsening energy
trilemma at the time of increased geopolitical tensions that add further
challenges to this trilemma. The Biden administration hopes to resolve this
trilemma with an integrated vision of “building back better.”4 This vision of
“building back better” hopes to respond to each of the prongs of the energy
trilemma, while keeping an eye on geopolitical, energy-related tensions.5
The Biden administration finds itself in a bind in resolving this energy
trilemma. As we shall see, the Biden administration’s approach to
international economic governance is small-c conservative. This small-c
conservativism is ultimately incompatible with taking the build back better
program to a global scale. Such a program can only be realized to the extent
the Biden administration invests greater political and diplomatic capital in free
trade agreements and building a deeper international economic order to
support energy transition.
2.
Covid-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, WORLDOMETERS, https://www.worldometers.info/
coronavirus/ (last updated Feb. 27, 2021).
3.

INT’L MONETARY FUND, A YEAR LIKE NO OTHER: IMF ANNUAL REPORT 2020 5 (2020).

4.
The Biden Plan to Build a Modern Sustainable Infrastructure and An Equitable Clean Energy
Future, BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/clean-energy/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter Biden
Build].
5.
The Biden Plan to Secure Environmental Justice and Equitable Economic Activity,
BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/environmental-justice-plan/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter
Biden Plan].
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ENERGY TRILEMMA

This section addresses the underlying challenge energy policy poses on
the international stage. It outlines that energy policy traditionally responds to
a trilemma of: environmental sustainability, energy equity/affordability, and
energy security. This trilemma transcends energy policy and in fact, is at the
heart of international energy law. The section outlines that current
circumstances exacerbate the urgency of each of the prongs of the dilemma.
The energy trilemma is reflected already in the core themes struck by
then President Biden’s transition.6 President Biden’s central message in his
victory speech was that “I believe it's this: Americans have called upon us to
marshal the forces of decency, the forces of fairness, to marshal the forces of
science and the forces of hope in the great battles of our time.” 7 Relevantly
for current purposes, President Biden highlighted the battle to build
prosperity.8 He also highlighted, “the battle to save our planet by getting
climate under control.”9 President Biden’s transition website similarly lists as
two of its four priorities “economic recovery” and “climate change.”10 This
speech at core thus hits on two of the three prongs of the energy trilemma—
environmental sustainability (climate change) and energy equity/affordability
(building prosperity).
The third prong of the energy trilemma is about energy security.11
Energy security is about the security of energy supply.12 This security of
supply is threatened in two separate, yet equally important ways. First, it is
threatened by external, geopolitical events.13 One example of such external,
geo-political events includes recent violent tensions between Iran, Saudi
Arabia, and the United States.14 These tensions led to a drone attack on one
6.

Id.

7.
Read the full text of Joe Biden's speech after historic election, ABC (Nov. 7, 2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/read-full-text-joe-bidens-speech-historic-election/story?id=74084462.
8.

Id.

9.

Id.

10.
Priorities, BIDEN-HARRIS TRANSITION, https://buildbackbetter.gov/priorities/ (last visited
Jan 15, 2021).
11.
World Energy Trilemma Index, WORLD ENERGY COUNCIL, https://www.worldenergy.org/
transition-toolkit/world-energy-trilemma-index (last visited Jan. 15, 2021).
12.

Daniel Yergin, Ensuring Energy Security, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 69, 69–78 (2006).

Oil security: The global oil market remains vulnerable to a wide range of risk factors, INT’L
ENERGY AGENCY (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.iea.org/areas-of-work/ensuring-energy-security/oilsecurity (last visited Jan. 19, 2021).
13.

14.
See Ellen R. Wald, 3 Reasons Iran Can’t Put a Toll on the Straits of Hormuz, FORBES (July
8, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenrwald/2019/07/08/3-reasons-iran-cant-put-a-toll-on-the-straitof-hormuz/?sh=45267cb75ff2 (discussing summer 2019 threats to navigation through the straits); Rockford
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of Saudi Arabia’s largest oil refining installations, sending shockwaves
through energy markets.15 Further, Iran has threatened one of the most
important shipping lanes for global oil supplies, the Straits of Hormuz.16
Three similarly important areas of tension include: 1) the South China Sea,
an area in which the People’s Republic of China is currently threatening
energy security through unlawful enforcement actions; 2) the Black Sea, an
area in which Russia threatens energy security by unlawfully annexed Crimea;
and 3) the Baltic Sea, an area of importance for European pipeline access that
is seeing increased Russian escalation.17
Second, energy security also can be impaired for reasons internal to
existing energy markets. These markets cannot rely upon technology that is
unable to deliver energy when it is needed. One such problem is the so-called
intermittent problem of renewable energy (how to deliver energy when the
sun does not shine and the wind does not blow).18 This problem has also arisen
in traditional energy markets, with the 2001 rolling California blackouts being
one example.19
These three prongs of the energy trilemma are reflected in a number of
international legal regimes. Environmental sustainability and climate change
are subject to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

Weitz, Explainer:
Could Iran Close the Strait of Hormuz, NAVY TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/01/08/explainer-could-iran-close-the-strait-ofhormuz/; see also Iran Seizes British Tanker in Strait of Hormuz, BBC (July 20, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-49053383; Ben Hubbard et al., Two Major Saudi Oil Installations Hit by
(Sept.
15,
2019),
Drone
Strike,
and
U.S.
Blames
Iran,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-refineries-drone- attack.html (last
updated Jan.15, 2020) (discussing the drone strike on Abqaiq and Khurais); see also Saudi Arabia Oil
Attacks:
UN 'Unable to Confirm Iranian Involvement’, BBC (Dec. 11, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50742224 (discussing Iranian disputing responsibility for
the drone strike).
15.

Hubbard, supra note 14.

16.

See Wald, supra note 14; see also Weitz, supra note 14.

17.
See Tensions flare over South China Sea energy reserves, ARGUS (July 17, 2019),
https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/1941353-tensions-flare-over-south-china-sea-energy-reserves; see
also Ariel Cohen, As Russia Closes In On Crimea's Energy Resources, What Is Next For Ukraine?, FORBES
(Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/02/28/as-russia-closes-in-on-crimeasenergy-resources-what-is-next-for-ukraine/?sh=69b3408929cd; see also Andrew E. Kramer, Pipeline
Politics:
Why
Nord
Stream
2
Is
Back
in
the
Spotlight,
N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/world/europe/nord-stream-2-russia-germany.html (last updated
Sept. 16, 2020).
18.
Paul Rogers, California grid operator warned of power shortages as state transitioned to
clean energy, MERCURY NEWS, https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/08/17/california-blackouts-exposeproblems-in-states-transition-to-clean-energy/ (last updated Aug. 17, 2020).
19.

Id.

351926-ILSA_International_27-2_Text.indd 74

3/26/21 12:35 PM

Sourgens

2021]

297

and the Paris Agreement concluded under its auspices.20 Questions of energy
affordability and equity fall under human rights as well as international
economic law consisting broadly of trade and investment law.21 Energy
security in turn can be improved both by international economic law to address
internal energy problems, regimes governing international peace, and security
to address geopolitical threats.
Each of these different prongs of the trilemma, in addition, calls on
multiple other international legal regimes to the floor. Most centrally,
international climate concerns have also raised human rights issues.22 These
human rights issues have led domestic courts in the Netherlands to order
governments to increase their emission reduction targets.23 These issues have
also made headway in the Inter-American system to focus on the human rights
implications of climate change and thus increased pressure to increase climate
action.24
At the same time, such human rights concerns also affect energy equity.25
Energy is one of the backbones necessary for economic activity.26 It is
essential to deliver healthcare services and education, and thus central to
development.27 Moreover, it is central to a host of positive human rights to
the point that scholars have posited the existence of a right to electricity.28
As the Biden administration focuses on energy and climate policy, it,
therefore, acts not just in one area of international law. Rather, its policies
20.
See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, Sept. 5, 1992, S.
TREATY DOC NO. 102–38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; see also Paris Agreement art. 2, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev/ [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
21.
Apurvaa Pandey, Energy: A Basic Human Right, GEOPOLITICAL MONITOR (Apr. 24, 2018),
https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/energy-a-basic-human-right/.
22.
See Maria L. Banda, Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Advisory Opinion on the
Environment and Human Rights, 22 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (May 10, 2018),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/6/inter-american-court-human-rights-advisory-opinionenvironment-and-human#_edn1; see also Groundbreaking Inquiry in Philippines Links Carbon Majors to
Human Rights Impacts of Climate Change, Calls for Greater Accountability, CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. L.
(Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.ciel.org/news/groundbreaking-inquiry-in-philippines-links-carbon-majors-tohuman-rights-impacts-of-climate-change-calls-for-greater-accountability/.
23.

HR 20 December 2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007.

24.
The Environment and Human Rights (State Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the
Context of the Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity: Interpretation and
Scope of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC23/17, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) No. 23 (Nov. 15, 2017) 1, 32.
25.
(2020).

Lars Löfquist, Is There a Universal Right to Electricity?, 24 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 711, 718

26.

Id. at 711.

27.

Id. at 721.

28.

Id. at 712.
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will have to move across different areas of international law. 29 Energy and
climate cannot be reduced to a single regime. They are systemic concerns.
As this Essay will discuss, the Biden administration is approaching climate
and energy from a systemic perspective. Yet, its approach likely lacks the
toolkit fully to unlock the energy trilemma. The two main problems for the
Biden administration are the lack of a clear vision of how the energy trilemma
can be balanced and the thorny nature of any engagement with China—an
engagement for which the current Biden team seems not as well equipped as
it could have been.30 At the same time, the Biden administration’s approach
of “building back better” may well provide the building blocks out of which
such a fuller approach could be built.31 There thus remains a reason to be
cautiously optimistic that the Biden administration will fully embrace its
slogan as part of a broader overhaul of the global legal energy infrastructure.
II.

BUILDING BACK BETTER

The Biden administration recognizes the need to integrate energy
solutions into a response involving the entire government rather than just any
one department.32 This commitment is most clearly visible in two contexts.
The first is in the programmatic approach to building back better.33 The
second is in the staffing of key positions dealing with international and
domestic energy policy.34 Both of these help us to move into focus what the
Biden (Energy) Doctrine will likely look like. The first subsection will
address each of these in turn and attempt to establish what can be gleaned from
them to deduce a Biden (Energy) Doctrine. The second subsection will outline
the challenges this doctrine will face both as a matter of policy statements

29.
The Power of America’s Example: The Biden Plan for Leading the Democratic World to
Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century, BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/americanleadership/ (last
visited Jan. 15, 2021) [hereinafter Power of America].
30.
See Alex Gullén, Biden says his team has ‘no time to waste’, POLITICO (Dec. 19, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/19/biden-climate-team-announcement-448717; see also Rick
Gladstone, Biden to Face Long List of Foreign Challenges, With China No.1, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/07/world/americas/Biden-foreign-policy.html.
31.
See Jennifer Epstein, Biden Offers ‘Build Back Better’ Plan to Revive Economy, BLOOMBERG
(July 9, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-09/biden-offers-build-back-betterapproach-to-reviving-economy.
32.

See generally Biden Build, supra note 4.

33.
See generally Build Back Better: Joe Biden’s Jobs and Economic Recovery Plan for Working
Families, BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/build-back-better/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2021) [hereinafter
Build Back Better].
34.
(Dec. 15,
biden/.

See, e.g., Will Englund et al., Biden to name Granhold as energy secretary, WASH. POST
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/12/15/granholm-energy-secretary-
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made by the Biden administration and as a matter of the geopolitical landscape
that the Trump administration has left behind for the Biden administration.
A.

Build Back Better as an Energy Program

No slogan better captures the Biden administration’s aspirations than
“build back better.”35 This slogan can be translated into four distinct areas of
policy action under the Biden administration. The first is a renewed
commitment to emissions reduction under the Paris Agreement.36 The second
is a renewed commitment to engagement—as opposed to the unilateralism of
the Trump administration.37 Circumstances would suggest, however, that the
Biden administration will have a more pragmatic approach of incrementalism
as opposed to the attempts at concluding framework conventions that drove
part of the Obama agenda.38 Third, it is likely that the Biden administration
will seek to strengthen development aid and climate finance to support United
States energy exports while supporting global greenhouse gas mitigation
efforts.39 Finally, the Biden administration is not likely to abandon oil and gas
or move to drastic steps such as carbon border adjustments.40 Rather, it will
likely seek to bring oil and gas companies into the climate process.

1. The Paris Agreement
It is an article of faith for the Biden administration to rejoin the Paris
Agreement on January 20, 2021. Rejoining the Paris Agreement means that
the United States will continue to participate in the procedural obligations laid
out in the Paris Agreement.41 These procedural obligations chiefly concern
reporting and continued negotiation towards open items on the Paris

35.

Build Back Better, supra note 33.

36.
See Press Release, Biden Harris Transition, Statement by President-elect Joe Biden on the
Five-Year Anniversary of the Paris Agreement (Dec. 12, 2020), https://buildbackbetter.gov/pressreleases/statement-by-president-elect-joe-biden-on-the-five-year-anniversary-of-the-paris-agreement/.
37.

See Power of America, supra note 29.

See Richard A. Kessler, Pragmatic Biden has political know-how to push green agenda,
RECHARGE,
https://www.rechargenews.com/wind/pragmatic-biden-has-political-know-how-to-pushgreen-agenda/2-1-907798 (last updated Nov. 9, 2020).
38.

39.
See generally The Biden Plan for Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice,
BIDENHARRIS, https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2021) [hereinafter Clean Energy
Revolution].
40.
See Heidi Vella, Joe Biden is president-elect: what now for US oil and gas?, OFFSHORE
TECH., https://www.offshore-technology.com/features/joe-biden-is-president-elect-what-now-for-us-oiland-gas/ (last updated Dec. 6, 2020).
41.

See DANIEL BODANSKY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 209–26 (2017).
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Agreement agenda.42 Importantly, one such item that has yet to lead to broad
agreement concerns is carbon markets.43 The United States rejoining the Paris
Agreement will, therefore, add important information to global climate efforts
and add a voice in favor of resolving important items left open in the Paris
Agreement itself.44
However, rejoining the Paris Agreement also raises a more fundamental
question. What happens to the United States emission reduction contributions
under the Paris Agreement? The Paris Agreement does not mandate emission
reduction quotas.45 Instead, the Paris Agreement leaves it to each Member
State to make nationally determined contributions (NDCs), in which each
Member State sets out its own emission reduction targets.46 The Paris
Agreement itself does not make these NDCs binding.47 NDCs can become
binding as unilateral acts made pursuant to a treaty.48
The original United States NDC was such a binding unilateral act.49 It
was intended to create reliance interests in the States to increase the ambition
in their own emission reduction policies—and it did.50 But with the Trump
administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the status of the
United States NDC has become more problematic.51
It is likely that the Biden administration will indirectly address this
uncertainty.52 Many of the United States’ Paris Agreement treaty partners

42.

Id.

See Diane Desierto, COP25 NEGOTIATIONS FAIL: CAN CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION,
ADJUDICATION, AND/OR ARBITRATION COMPEL STATES TO ACT FASTER TO IMPLEMENT CLIMATE
OBLIGATIONS?, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/cop25-negotiations-failcan-climate-change-litigation-adjudication-and-or-arbitration-compel-states-to-act-faster-to-implementclimate-obligations/.
43.

44.
Emma Newburger, Biden will rejoin the Paris Climate Accord. Here’s what happens next,
CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/20/biden-to-rejoin-paris-climate-accord-heres-what-happensnext-.html (last updated Nov. 20, 2020).
45.

See generally Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 2, ¶ 1(a).

46.
Id. art. 4, ¶ 2; see also Frédéric G. Sourgens, Climate Commons Law: The Transformative
Force of the Paris Agreement, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 885, 888 (2018).
47.

Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4, ¶ 11.

48.

Sourgens, supra note 46, at 893.

49.

Id. at 894.

50.

Id. at 935.

51.
Press Release, Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, On the U.S.
Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (Nov. 4, 2019).
52.
See David Waskow et al., How Biden Can Make the US a Global Leader on Climate Action,
WORLD RES. INST. (Nov. 12, 2020), https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/11/biden-us-leadership-fight-climatechange.
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have increased their own NDCs.53 Most notably, the European Union has
announced such a plan.54 Therefore, it is likely that the United States will
announce an increase in its NDC.55
The problem with such an announcement is the manner of its
implementation. The first United States NDC was premised upon
administrative action, most notably the Clean Power Plan.56 As the Biden
administration takes office, such new administrative action will require time
both to design and shepherd through the United States administrative law
notice-and-comment process.57 It is likely that the Biden administration will
look to energy policy in order to shore up its NDC.58 But the exact nature of
this action may well be complicated by legislative agendas. This means that
there may be a lag between the United States’ expression of intention to
improve upon its NDC and its ability to actually push climate policies to
submit such an updated NDC.
It is noteworthy that this lag time may well present an opportunity. As
with the first United States NDC, the United States could use the formulation
of its own NDC as a means to coordinate with third states.59 The United States
NDC, therefore, could become a step towards building a new global energy
infrastructure.60 If the United States were to use the opportunity in this
fashion, it is likely that a second United States NDC would also become
legally binding as a unilateral act made pursuant to a treaty. As such, it would
tether the United States in a binding fashion to a forming international energy
consensus.61

53.
CAT
Climate
Target
Update
Tracker,
CLIMATE
ACTION
TRACKER,
https://climateactiontracker.org/climate-target-update-tracker (last updated Jan. 22, 2021); see generally
Paris Agreement, supra note 20.
54.
CAT Climate Target Update Tracker United Kingdom, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER, (Dec.
12, 2020), https://climateactiontracker.org/climate-target-update-tracker/united-kingdom/.
55.

See Clean Energy Revolution, supra note 39.

56.
United States of America First NDC, U. N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(Mar. 9, 2016), https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ndcstaging/PublishedDocuments/United%20States%20of
%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf; JAMES E. MCCARTHY ET.AT.,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44341, EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2017).
57.

See 5 U.S.C. §553.

58.

See Clean Energy Revolution, supra note 39.

59.

Waskow, supra note 52.

60.

Id.

61.

Id.
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Renewed Engagement

The NDC process already hints at one of the hallmarks of what to expect
from the Biden administration. The Biden administration has vowed to reengage with the world by means of diplomacy.62 It has signaled a sharp turn
around vis-à-vis the Trump administration and its brand of unilateralism.63
As the NDC process already indicates, it is likely that this form of
engagement will follow the blueprint for the Paris Agreement NDCs. That is,
there is likely to be bilateral diplomacy to shore up support for shared energy
and climate goals with United States partners.64 One of the partners in this
respect was Canada, and this remains as such.65 Another potential partner
includes the European Union.66
The most important party for such renewed engagement is China. China
and the United States find themselves in critical opposition on security
questions that have significant implications for energy security.67 The most
important difference involves the South China Sea.68 China has advanced
significant maritime claims—claims which have been decisively rejected by
an international law of the sea tribunal.69 Despite this loss, China has moved
ahead with aggressive enforcement action in the South China Sea due to
violation of international law.70 Chinese action impairs energy security as
China is threatening natural resource exploration in the region with military
force.71 Further, the most significant shipping lanes pass through the South
China Sea,72 thus impairing freedom of navigation and global supply chains.
62.
David Sanger, The End of ‘America First’: How Biden Says He Will Re-engage With the
World, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/09/us/politics/biden-foreign-policy.html (last
updated Nov. 30, 2020).
63.

Id.

64.

ERIK BRATTBERG, REINVENTING TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ON CLIMATE, DEMOCRACY,
for Int’l Peace) 1st ed. (2020).

AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (Carnegie Endowment

65.
Kathiann M. Kowalski, How U.S.-Canada collaboration could boost both countries’ climate
responses, ENERGY NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 27, 2019), https://energynews.us/2019/03/27/midwest/how-us-canada-collaboration-could-boost-both-countries-climate-responses/.
66.

Brattberg, supra note 64 at 1.

67.
Wu Xinbo, U.S. Security Policy in Asia: Implications for China—-U.S. Relations, 22 ISEAS
Yusof Ishak Inst. 479, 480 (2000).
68.

Pompeo, supra note 51.

69.
Diane A. Desierto, China’s Maritime Law Enforcement Activities in the South China Sea, 96
INT’L L. STUD. 257, 264 (2020).
70.

Id. at 267.

71.
Lirong Wang, Sea lanes and Chinese National Energy Security, 73 J. COASTAL RSCH. 572,
574 (2015).
72.
See How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea?, CHINAPOWER,
https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/ (last updated Jan. 25, 2021).
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The renewed engagement with China and other potential partners on
energy and climate policy is likely to be bilateral and informal. That is, the
Biden administration is unlikely to attempt the grand bargain route of a TransPacific Partnership (TPP).73 This TPP was one of the most important
documents to create a multilateral framework for deep-seated engagement on
energy trade and infrastructure, among other goals.
Had it been ratified, the TPP would have been one of the greatest United
States foreign policy successes in the region. Any multilateral treaty requires
compromise and is in many ways imperfect. But the rules laid out in the TPP
would have provided a strong framework for cooperation on energy
questions.74 It would have allowed the United States to engage China in a
multilateral framework that would have combined energy and trade-related
issues in a comprehensive manner.75
But the lesson from the TPP is that such agreements make for bad
politics.76 It is not likely that such an agreement could be ratified as a treaty
or concluded as a Congressional-Executive Agreement.77 Such far-reaching
policy proposals are unlikely to receive needed support from both the
progressive left and populist right. Consequently, diplomatic engagement
with partners is likely to increase. But, it is highly likely to be bilateral rather
than broadly multilateral. And it is more likely to be informal rather than take
the form of treaties requiring Congressional approval.

3.

Climate Finance and Development Aid

The Biden administration is committed to a program of energy
infrastructure investment.78 This commitment is most visible in its domestic
agenda.79 “Build back better” is one of the key Biden campaign slogans.80
This slogan highlights a commitment to energy infrastructure investment in

73.
James McBride et al., What Is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-trans-pacific-partnership-tpp (last updated Feb. 1, 2021).
74.
Michael Levi, What the TPP Means for LNG, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-tpp-means-lng.
75.
See Mireya Solis, The Containment Fallacy: China and the TPP, BROOKINGS (May 24,
2013), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/05/24/the-containment-fallacy-china-and-the-tpp/.
76.

See Frédéric G. Sourgens, Supernational Law, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 155, 158 (2017).

77.
Oona Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking
in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1353–54 (2008) (discussing NAFTA and other free trade
agreements).
78.

Biden Build, supra note 4.

79.

Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037, 7041 (Jan. 25, 2021).

80.

Id.
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the United States domestically.81 This commitment is more likely to succeed
with Democratic legislative majorities in the U.S. House of Representatives
and the U.S. Senate.
The Biden administration’s commitment to energy infrastructure
investments does not end at the water’s edge. One of the main problems for
climate action is that many states lack the means to overhaul existing energy
infrastructure.82 This means that climate action can only be successful if states
contribute significant funds to climate finance.83
The Paris Agreement already contains a commitment for a climate
finance mechanism.84 The original goal was to raise $100 billion per year in
climate finance funding.85 This goal still falls significantly short of the
necessary resources to meet Paris’ goals. Ultimately, this goal, in turn, will
have to be increased.86
The Biden administration will likely increase its efforts in providing
climate finance to support energy infrastructure development abroad.87
Importantly, such climate finance does not require the direct use of U.S.
taxpayer dollars to build powerplants overseas.88 Rather, climate finance
relies on governments to provide guarantees for loans and assistance in
arranging commercial and multilateral financing for projects.89 Such
financing can take the form of investment insurance.90 Such action is more
likely to be politically acceptable yet still supportive of infrastructure
development overseas.

81.

Biden Build, supra note 4.

82.
DILIP AHUJA & MARIKA TATSUTANI, THE WORLD ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5, 9, 35 (2008).
83.
Changing the Finance, Financing the Change, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME,
https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/climate-change/what-we-do/climate-finance (last visited
Jan. 22, 2021).
84.

Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 9.

85.

Jorge Gastelumendi & Inka Gnittke, Climate Finance (Article 9), in THE PARIS AGREEMENT
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 239, 241 (Daniel Klein et al. eds., 2017).

ON CLIMATE CHANGE:

86.
See generally Chrysa Alexandraki, COP 24 and Climate Finance: A Stepping Stone or a
Blurred Line?, EJILTALK! (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/cop-24-and-climate-finance-astepping-stone-or-a-blurred-line/.
87.
See Baysa Naran et al., The Biden Administration’s potential impact on climate finance,
CLIMATE POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/the-bidenadministrations-potential-impact-on-climate-finance/.
88.
See RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10763, PARIS AGREEMENT: U.S.
CLIMATE FINANCE COMMITMENTS (2019) (discussing the different forms of international financial
assistance).
89.

See generally id. (detailing the manners in which the U.S. provides climate finance).

90.

Id.
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One of the reasons states offer certain forms of climate finance is because
they can further serve as export finance.91 That is, climate finance can assist
U.S. businesses in building and operating foreign energy projects.92 This
means that such foreign infrastructure has a beneficial economic impact on
the United States climate finance, which is likely an avenue of significant
United States engagement.93
On the other hand, it is not particularly likely that the United States will
enter into free trade agreements in the short term.94 The Biden administration
has already announced its intention to focus on domestic economic investment
and growth instead.95 This means that the Biden administration will likely not
expand market access systemically or otherwise expand trade and investment
protections to support energy infrastructure overhaul. At the same time, there
is no indication that the United States will exit existing U.S. free trade
agreements or investment protection treaties.96 The Biden administration is,
therefore, likely to increase support for building back better abroad. It will do
so through informal financing mechanisms and under the protection of
existing bilateral and multilateral treaties. It is not likely to retool how it
would assist in such financing and investment completely.

4.

Fossil Fuels

The Biden administration has not indicated an all-out effort to dismantle
the oil and gas industry. On the domestic front, the Biden administration has
instead attempted to follow a balancing act between environmental and energy
interests. This balancing act is most visible in the Biden campaign’s stance
on hydraulic fracturing.97 The Biden campaign has announced its intention
not to permit hydraulic fracturing on public lands.98 It has expressly rejected

91.
See Igor Shishlov, G20 Governments Must Urgently Align Their Export Credits With The
Paris Agreement, ID4D (Sept. 14, 2020), https://ideas4development.org/en/paris-agreement-role-ofexport-credits/ (for a discussion of export finance in energy).
92.
See Climate Finance, WORLD RES. INST., https://www.wri.org/our-work/project/climatefinance/climate-finance-and-private-sector (last visited Jan. 23, 2020).
93.

See generally id.

94.
See generally Tatiana L. Palermo, The future of free trade, GEOPOLITICAL INTELLIGENCE
SERV. (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.gisreportsonline.com/the-future-of-free-trade,economy,3340.html.
95.
See Nick Allen, Joe Biden says ‘no trade deals’ until he has invested in America first,
TELEGRAPH (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/12/02/joe-biden-says-no-trade-dealshas-invested-america-first/.
96.

See generally Palermo, supra note 94.

97.
Vicky B. Varela, What’s Next for Fracking Under Biden?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec.
18, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/whats-next-fracking-under-biden.
98.

Id.
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banning the process on private land.99 Further, it is unclear whether the Biden
administration will not grandfather in existing producers on public lands.100
This means that the ban would only apply to new oil and gas developments on
public lands.101
This suggests that the Biden administration will also follow an
international policy that will be, on the whole, supportive of the oil and gas
industry.102 Thus, it is likely that the United States will continue to support
natural gas-fired powerplants worldwide and protect global natural gas
infrastructure.103 (Having come full circle, the United States recently sent an
aircraft carrier to Vietnam at the request of the Vietnamese government due
to Chinese threats against Vietnamese leased offshore gas projects.104 The
Biden administration will likely continue such “freedom of navigation”
diplomacy in the region, thus protecting oil and gas industry interests in the
region.)
It is unlikely that the United States would drastically alter other elements
of the international energy system. The Biden administration looks poised to
work with oil and gas as part of the energy mix.105 It is more likely that the
Biden administration would work with foreign partners on tailpipe and
smokestack technology standards.
B.

Dramatis Personae

Policy programs are only successful to the extent that they are
competently implemented. Therefore, it is important not just to look at policy
programs. The lead actors asked to implement these programs are just as
important. This section will focus on a few of the leading Biden
administration nominees that have been announced to date and assess their
impact on global energy policy.

99.

Id.

100.

Id.

101.

Id.

102.

Varela, supra note 97.

103.

Id.

104. See Reuters Staff, U.S. says completes second aircraft carrier visit to Viet., REUTERS (Mar.
11, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-usa/u-s-says-completes-second-aircraft-carriervisit-to-vietnam-idUSKBN20Y0F3.
105. Timothy Puko, Biden’s Plan to Shift Energy Policy Faces Headwinds, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 10,
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-plan-to-shift-energy-policy-faces-headwinds-11605016802.
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Lead Actors

The three most important persons for the Biden program are Antony
Blinken, John Kerry, and Gina McCarthy. Antony Blinken (Blinken) is
President Biden’s nominee to serve as Secretary of State.106 President Biden
has nominated John Kerry (Kerry) as special envoy for climate matter.107
Lastly, President Biden has called upon Gina McCarthy (McCarthy) to serve
as White House coordinator on climate matters.108 Each of these individuals
is likely to have a direct impact on the implementation of the energy policy
program outlined in the previous section.
Antony Blinken is a longstanding U.S. diplomat.109 Blinken first entered
government service in 1993 as the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
of State for European and Canadian Affairs.110 Blinken has since held national
security positions and State Department positions in the Clinton and Obama
administrations.111 Blinken has expressed strong support for increasing NDC
ambition and has called for meetings with major emitters to do so. 112 Blinken
is known as a strong internationalist.113 He is committed to multilateralist
solutions to foreign policy problems.114 Blinken has significant European
experience, having attended a high school in France, and is known as a
devotee of French culture.115 Further, he is known as a supporter of robust

106. See The Cabinet, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/cabinet/ (last
visited Jan. 30, 2021); Lara Jakes et al., Biden Chooses Antony Blinken, Defender of Global Alliances, as
Secretary of State, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/22/us/politics/biden-antony-blinkensecretary-of-state.html (last updated Dec. 2, 2020).
107. The Cabinet, supra note 106; Lisa Friedman, With John Kerry Pick, Biden Selects a ‘Climate
Envoy’ With Stature, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/climate/john-kerry-climatechange.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2020).
108. Lisa Friedman, Biden to Name Gina McCarthy, Former E.P.A. Chief, as White House
Climate Coordinator, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/15/climate/ginamccarthy-biden-climate.html.
109. Deputy
Secretary
State,
U.S.
DEP’T
2017.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/236057.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2021).
110.

Id.

111.

Id.

OF

ST.,

https://2009-

112. Tony Walker, From ‘America first’ to ‘America together’: who is Antony Blinken, Biden’s
pick for secretary of state?, CONVERSATION (Nov. 25, 2020), https://theconversation.com/from-americafirst-to-america-together-who-is-antony-blinken-bidens-pick-for-secretary-of-state-150739.
113. David M. Herszenhorn & Rym Momtaz, 9 things to know about Antony Blinken, the next US
secretary of state, POLITICO (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.politico.eu/article/nine-things-to-think-aboutantony-blinken/.
114.

Id.

115.

Id.
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United States involvement in global security threats, including by military
force.116
John Kerry’s role as special envoy is similarly significant. The role is a
cabinet-level position.117 Kerry previously served as Secretary of State in the
Obama administration.118 In fact, the Paris Agreement was concluded during
Kerry’s tenure as Secretary of State.119 Similar to Blinken, Kerry has
significant European leanings and is known as a Francophile.120 Prior to
service as Secretary of State, Kerry served as a U.S. Senator.121 Thus, he
brings strong political experience and instincts mixed together with foreign
policy experience and weight.
Gina McCarthy will serve as the head of the White House Office of
Domestic Climate Policy.122 In this position, McCarthy will also have
significant influence over energy and climate questions within the White
House.123 McCarthy is a former Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Administrator.124 McCarthy was one of the authors of the Clean Power
Plan.125 This plan was at the heart of the first United States NDC. Thus,
McCarthy brings significant expertise from the domestic regulatory
perspective to climate affairs.126 This expertise is particularly important as
Kerry and McCarthy are said to be friends with a history of working together
in formulating U.S. climate policy by combining regulatory and foreign policy
experience.127

116.

Id.

117. Kate Sullivan, Biden prioritizes climate crisis by naming John Kerry special envoy, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/23/politics/john-kerry-biden-climate-envoy/index.html (last updated Nov.
24, 2020).
118.

Id.

119.

Id.

120. AFP, John Kerry Given France's Highest Honour, LOCAL (Dec. 11, 2016),
https://www.thelocal.fr/20161211/john-kerry-given-frances-highest-honour.
121.

John Kerry, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/John_Kerry (last visited Jan. 27, 2021).

122. Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, Biden Picks Former EPA Chief as White House Climate
Czar,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
15,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/climateenvironment/2020/12/15/gina-mccarthy-climate-change-czar-biden/.
123.

Id.

124.

Id.

125. Coral Davenport & Lisa Friedman, Biden’s Twin Climate Chiefs, McCarthy and Kerry, Face
a Monumental Task, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/16/climate/gina-mccarthy-johnkerry-climate-adviser.html (last updated Dec. 21, 2020).
126.

Id.

127.

Id.

351926-ILSA_International_27-2_Text.indd 86

3/26/21 12:35 PM

Sourgens

2021]

2.

309

Supporting Actors

Four further positions are of particular importance as the Biden team tries
to tackle the global energy trilemma. These positions are the EPA
administrator, the U.S. Trade Representative, the Secretary of Defense, and
the National Security Advisor.128 The expertise here follows the same
footsteps as the main actors as that they have significant prior experience in
their respective resorts.129
President Biden chose Michael Regan as his appointee for EPA
administrator.130 Mr. Regan has significant experience as a regulator.131 Mr.
Regan’s past work has been in air quality regulation.132 Thus, he brings
expertise in emissions regulations and climate matters to bear and therefore
assists the Kerry-McCarthy team with the implementation of climate
policies.133
President Biden named Katherine Tai as his nominee for U.S. Trade
Representative.134 The U.S. Trade Representative is charged with the
negotiation of U.S. trade agreements and sets U.S. trade policy.135 Katherine
Tai is a China expert and Mandarin speaker.136 She is expected to continue a
tough line on China in trade questions.137
On questions of energy security, the Biden administration national
security team will have an outsized importance. The main players in the
national security team are the Secretary of Defense and National Security

128. See generally NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, https://www.nsa.gov (last visited Jan. 30, 2021);
see also Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III, U.S. DEP’T DEF., https://www.defense.gov/OurStory/Meet-the-Team/Secretary-of-Defense/ (last visited Jan.30, 2021); see also OFF. OF THE U.S. REP.,
https://ustr.gov (last visited Jan. 30, 2021); see also U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov (last
visited Jan. 30, 2021).
129. See NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, supra note 128; see also Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin
III, supra note 128; see also OFF. OF THE U.S. REP., supra note 128.
130. See The Cabinet, supra note 106; Jeff Tollefson, Biden’s pick to head US environment agency
heartens scientists, NATURE (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03621-6.
131.

See Tollefson, supra note 130.

132.

Id.

133.

Id.

134. See The Cabinet, supra note 106; Yen Nee Lee, Biden’s pick for top U.S. trade official will
continue tough line on China, says ex-Trump official, CNBC (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/18/bidens-ustr-pick-katherine-tai-will-be-tough-on-china-ex-trumpofficial.html.
135.

See Lee, supra note 134.

136.

Id.

137.

Id.
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advisor.138 President Biden has announced that he will nominate General
Lloyd J. Austin III as Secretary of Defense.139 Austin is a former head of U.S.
Central Command.140 His experience lies predominantly in the Middle East,
not with China or Russia. 141 Joe Biden finally chose Jake Sullivan as his
National Security Advisor.142 Sullivan, a Clinton State Department veteran
and later National Security Advisor to then-Vice President Biden, is known as
one of the architects of the Iran Nuclear Deal.143
C.

The Biden Energy Doctrine

The Obama foreign policy doctrine famously was “don’t do stupid
shit.”144 It sought to limit foreign military entanglements in Syria, much to
the dismay of many of the administration’s own veterans.145 At the same time,
the Obama administration had a desire to “go big.”146 Efforts such as the TPP
were key multilateral efforts that materially shifted U.S. foreign policy east
with a focus on Asia.147 This Asian focus was accompanied by an attempt to
cement this foreign policy in super-regional agreements that would achieve
grand policy objectives in one fell swoop.148
The Biden administration looks to follow a related but different mantra.
What emerges from both the policy proposals and cast of characters is a focus
on “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” As this discussion has shown so far, the
Biden administration does not appear poised to propose any significant
138. See generally NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY, supra note 128; see generally Secretary of Defense
Lloyd J. Austin III, supra note 128.
139. See The Cabinet, supra note 106; Lara Seligman et al., Biden picks retired general Lloyd
Austin to run Pentagon, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/07/lloyd-austin-bidensecretary-defense-frontrunner-contender-443479 (last updated Dec. 7, 2020).
140.

See The Cabinet, supra note 106; Seligman, supra note 139.

141. Michael E. O’Hanlon et al., Around the halls: Brookings experts on defense react to the
nomination of Gen. Lloyd Austin, BROOKINGS (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/orderfrom-chaos/2020/12/10/around-the-halls-brookings-experts-on-defense-react-to-the-nomination-of-genlloyd-austin/.
142. Natasha Bertrand, The inexorable rise of Jake Sullivan, POLITICO (Nov. 27, 2020),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/27/jake-sullivan-biden-national-security-440814.
143.

Id.

144. Michael T. Klare, Why Hillary Clinton Is Wrong About Obama’s Foreign Policy, NATION
(Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/why-hillary-clinton-wrong-about-obamasforeign-policy/.
145.

Id.

146.

See, e.g., McBride et al., supra note 73.

147.

See id.

148.

See generally id.
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multilateral free trade agreements, such as the TPP, that might be able to alter
energy supply chains globally.149 Additionally, the Biden administration does
not appear to be able to invest significant funds abroad to support energy
infrastructure transformations directly. Finally, the Biden administration does
not appear to depart from existing energy security paradigms significantly.
This approach appears fundamentally consistent with the people staffed
at the top. The Biden team is highly competent. But it is also fundamentally
conservative with a little c. That is, it has a strong belief in the status quo and
in fact, seems poised to return to it rather than to build a new paradigm. This,
therefore, suggests a mentality to keep with existing approaches.
On its face, it is difficult to reconcile “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” with
“build back better.” The “better” more than implies that existing structures
are fundamentally flawed. Therefore, the idea is to improve infrastructure,
improve living conditions, build more equitable energy systems, and more
equitable economies.
In the end, the two slogans do remain fundamentally consistent with each
other. The Biden administration fundamentally believes in existing
international legal processes. The administration does not wish to change the
status because it believes that these processes are, in fact, able to deliver an
incrementally better economic and energy infrastructure.
In sum, one should expect the Biden administration to support energy
security, energy equity, and environmental sustainability within the strictures
of the Paris Agreement and classic U.S. foreign policy. One should not expect
a fundamental departure legally, even as the Biden administration will attempt
to use these existing mechanisms to different ends—namely, to strengthen
renewable energy projects in the United States and support the construction
of such projects globally.
III. THE CHALLENGE AHEAD
The Biden administration’s approach presents several challenges for
energy policy going forward. Some of these challenges are premised in
personnel. Others are premised in a structural under-ambition to resolve the
problems posed by the energy trilemma. This section will briefly address each
of these challenges in turn.
A.

The Asia Problem

One of the key problems apparent in the senior team assembled by
President Biden has been its regional focus. Antony Blinken and John Kerry

149.

See Palermo, supra note 94.
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are first and foremost European experts.150 Their focus in diplomacy and
personal experience has focused on the European continent.151
At the same time, much of the expertise of the Biden administration on
the national security side is focused on the Middle East.152 General Austin has
significant experience as head of Central Command.153 Jack Sullivan, on the
other hand, is best known for his work on the Iran Nuclear Deal.154 Their
expertise thus is focused, in particular, on one of the last theaters of United
States engagement—the Middle East.155
Today’s global energy challenges are not European. Nor do they have
their roots in the Middle East. These challenges have a significant Asian
component. The most important player in global energy systems—outside of
the United States—is China.156 Without China, it is unlikely that climate
change can be halted.157 Without China, it is very difficult for the majority of
Asia to live with energy security because China has aggressive enforcement
in the South China Sea.158 The South China Sea, of course, is both important
as a focal point for global shipping lanes and as a source of significant natural
gas reserves in the region.159
The Biden administration’s team is not attuned to the challenges of this
region. The leading China expert in the administration is the U.S. Trade
Representative Tai.160 But statements by the Biden administration have
indicated that new free trade agreements are not a priority.161 Consequently,
the skillset of the U.S. Trade Representative will not be a direct asset in
handling the difficult relationship with China and the rest of Asia.
This is not to say that the Biden administration will not be able to
overcome these challenges. It is, however, an interesting reversal of the
Obama administration’s shift to Asia. As personnel implements policy, this

150.

See generally Herszenhorn & Momtaz, supra note 113; see, e.g., AFP, supra note 120.

151.

See generally Herszenhorn & Momtaz, supra note 113; see, e.g., AFP, supra note 120.

152.

See generally Power of America, supra note 29.

153.

Seligman et al., supra note 139.

154.

See generally Bertrand, supra note 142.

155.

See generally Power of America, supra note 29.

156. See Brye Butler Steeves & Helton Ricardo Ouriques, Energy Security: China and the United
States and the Divergence in Renewable Energy, 38 CONTEXTO INTERNACIONAL 643, 643, 658 (2016).
157.

See id. at 658.

158.

Desierto, supra note 69.

159. South China Sea - what you need to know, DEUTSCHE WELLE, (Aug. 11, 2017),
https://www.dw.com/en/south-china-sea-what-you-need-to-know/a-40054470.
160.

Lee, supra note 134.

161.

Allen, supra note 95.
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personnel seems less able to implement Asian policy as efficiently as one
might have hoped. Thus, there are significant challenges ahead.
B.

The Trilemma Problem

The Biden administration faces a more deep-seated problem with its
energy approach in another regard. The Biden doctrine of “if ain’t broke,
don’t fix it” works at the margins. It is unlikely to solve many of the systemic
problems underlying energy transition. That is, the Biden administration has
significant ambition, but the tools it intends to use are not up to the task.
The key problem the Biden administration will face is to achieve both
domestic and global buy in for a significant ramp up in climate action.
Climate action increases energy costs.162
Increased energy costs
disproportionately impact people with less means.163 So, as a whole, it is
likely that people will protest against such climate action.164 Such protests in
France, in fact, derailed French carbon taxation plans.165 On the international
side, it is similarly difficult to convince States to increase climate ambition
without an incentive of increased development. And this increased
development hinges in large part on economic growth that typically comes
with increased free trade.
The Biden administration thus must find a tool to increase energy equity
domestically and globally. The domestic tool to address this problem appears
to be governmental energy infrastructure investment. If sufficiently
ambitious, this tool might go a long way to address the underlying equity
problem. But this is only half the battle; the same equity concern is replicated
internationally. There thus needs to be a significant increase in global
investment in energy infrastructure. Such investment only makes sense with
a ramp-up and potential overhaul of free trade agreements. That is, it seems
impossible to solve environmental sustainability and climate change without
also addressing the broader international economic order.

162. Joel Jaeger & Devashree Saha, 10 Charts Show the Economic Benefits of US Climate Action,
WORLD RES. INST. (July 28, 2020), https://www.wri.org/blog/2020/07/economic-benefits-climate-actionus.
163. See, e.g., Ariel Drehobl, Low-Income Households Pay More for Energy, but Efficiency Can
Help, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.usnews.com/news/healthiest-communities/articles/202009-30/poor-households-pay-more-for-energy-but-efficiency-can-help.
164. See Somini Sengupta, Protesting Climate Change, Young People Take to Streets in a Global
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Sept. 21, 2019).
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The Biden administration further does not seem to have a clear plan to
address energy security. Currently, Chinese activity in the South China Seas
negatively affects energy security for the reasons outlined above. However,
China is also a key state in building an environmental coalition sufficient to
halt and turn back climate change.166 Here, energy security and environmental
sustainability appear at loggerheads with each other.
The Biden
administration appears to be focused on climate policy. But this focus is
always a hostage of security concerns. So far, the Biden administration has
not developed a plan for how to address this tension.
In other words, part of the problem of “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” is
that the Biden administration appears to be too pragmatic to achieve its own
climate ends. A greater focus on the “build back better” prong of its approach
would likely require a deeper investment in international economic law by the
United States. It requires a commitment to grow energy infrastructures
globally. But such a commitment is only realistic if the Biden administration
changes its priorities on free trade agreements. To build back better, and to
meet climate change, is trade policy. It is not just environmental or foreign
policy. This reality so far appears to be missing from the Biden
administration’s overall more cautious approach.

166.

See Steeves & Ouriques, supra note 156, at 658.
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